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MIKKE L GERKEN , JE S P E R KA L L E S T RU P ,
KL EMEN S KA P P E L , AND
DUNCAN PR I T CHARD
INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL COGNITIVE ECOLOGY
AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
1. INTRODUCTION
The articles in this special issue were selected from the 2010 Episteme conference,
“Cognitive Ecology: The Role of the Concept of Knowledge in Our Social Cognitive Ecology,”
which took place at the University of Edinburgh in June 2010. The overarching
purpose of the conference was to explore our epistemic concepts – and the concept
of knowledge in particular – from the perspective oﬀered by a social cognitive
ecology.
2. ON THE NOTION OF SOCIAL COGNITIVE ECOLOGY
The term ‘ecology’ is typically associated with a sub-discipline of biology. Roughly,
ecology is the study of living things’ relationships to the environment. Derivatively,
a cognitive ecology may be taken to be the study of living things’ cognitive relations
to their environment, whereas a social cognitive ecology may be taken to be the
study of the distinctively social aspects of such cognitive relations. But such a
characterization is, of course, rather broad.
In his contribution, Martin Kusch pursues a more speciﬁc characterization that
is also inspired by the biological notion of ecology. He characterizes cognitive
ecology in general as “the investigation into how organisms obtain information
about their surroundings.” Social cognitive ecology, in turn, is characterized as “the
inquiry into how highly gregarious, deeply interdependent cognizers (like us) obtain
information about their natural and social environment.” Moreover, according to
Kusch, a social cognitive ecology is a distinctive species of social epistemology
in that it is descriptive and empirically oriented; he writes that “social cognitive
ecology should be descriptive-explanatory rather than normative, and it should, wherever
possible, reckon with the results of the natural and social sciences.”
Like Kusch, Axel Gelfert emphasizes in his contribution the importance of
the empirical aspects of ecologies of epistemic concepts and the centrality of
evolutionary accounts. Speciﬁcally, Gelfert promotes a focus on how the concept
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of knowledge has evolved as an adaptive response to multiple, as opposed to
monocausal, pressures on epistemically interdependent social beings.
Lorraine Code has pursued a similar characterization in her book Ecological
Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location. In this work, she characterizes ecology
as “a study of habitats both physical and social where people endeavor to live well
together” (2006, 25). Moreover, Code also regards ecological thinking as empirically
informed. However, Code’s conception of ecological thinking does not align with
Kusch’s view that ecological thinking is a non-normative enterprise. Rather, she
conceives of it as a thoroughgoing revision of epistemology or even a new way of
doing epistemology.
These diﬀerent approaches exemplify somewhat overlapping conceptions of
the idea of a social cognitive ecology. But there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences with
regard to whether ecological thinking should be thought of as normative or merely
descriptive. Furthermore, each conception of social cognitive ecology involves
some speciﬁc and even programmatic assumptions. For example, neither Code’s
revisionism nor Kusch’s focus on the acquisition of information will be universally
agreed upon by self-declared social cognitive ecologists.
Moreover, the term ‘ecology’ may be used in much broader senses. To con-
sider a prominent example, in his widely read Steps to an Ecology of Mind (2000),
Gregory Bateson emphasizes relationships between the concepts and the
environment but also interrelations between the concepts themselves. This latter
focus is shared by many epistemologists. But whereas Bateson’s ecology of mind
concerns such interrelations quite generally, epistemologists are more likely to
be interested in how our epistemic concepts are interrelated and related to the
environment.
Thus, one way of thinking about a cognitive ecology is to think of it as the study of
how our (evolved) epistemic concepts are related to the environment and interrelated
in our thinking. If one thinks of a cognitive ecology in this manner, the idea of a
social cognitive ecology may be characterized, broadly and roughly, as follows: Social
cognitive ecology is the study of how epistemic concepts are interrelated and related to the physical
and social environment and of how such relations bear on the evolution of epistemic concepts and
vice versa.
Thus conceived, a social cognitive ecology is in some ways more restricted in
its focus than a general ecology of mind. For example, it purports to investigate
epistemic concepts in particular. On the other hand, the above characterization is
more inclusive than some of the ideas that have been proposed or presupposed in
this volume or elsewhere. For example, it includes both diachronic investigations
pertaining to the genesis of the epistemic concepts as well as synchronic
investigations of their present interrelations, functions, and social roles.
In sum, while the idea of a social cognitive ecology has gained increasing
attention, there continues to be ample room for debate about how to conceive
of the idea. This fact should be of little surprise, as there is ample room for debate
about virtually any broad methodological approach in philosophy. So, we can do
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no better than to brieﬂy consider the various contributions’ engagements with ideas
pertaining to a social cognitive ecology and its role in social epistemology.
3. SOCIAL COGNITIVE ECOLOGY AS SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
How may a social cognitive ecology contribute to social epistemology? Given the
diverse views on what a social cognitive ecology is, diverse views regarding what it
may contribute, if anything, is to be expected. The present issue of Episteme includes
contributions that, taken together, exemplify a wide range of views on the matter.
Some include an explicit meta-epistemological or methodological aspect. Others
seek to shed light on the methodological issues by way of example.
As we have noted, Code has put forward the view that ecological thinking
has the capacity to reconﬁgure epistemology, all the way down. Eschewing
individualism, ecological thinking assesses the eﬀects of situation, epistemic
responsibility, and social-political hierarchies as contributors to the place of
knowledge in a given cognitive ecology. In her contribution to the present volume,
“An Ecology of Epistemic Authority,” Code illustrates this aspect of ecological
thinking by using two examples of putatively authoritative knowledge to reexamine
the place of trust in knowledge and its entanglement with relations of epistemic
dependence.
In stark contrast, in his contribution (“Why Should We Care About the Concept
of Knowledge?”), Hilary Kornblith articulates a very pessimistic view about the
brand of social cognitive ecology that is pursued by Edward Craig in his highly
inﬂuential book Knowledge and the State of Nature (1990). Speciﬁcally, contra Craig,
Kornblith argues that “for those who wish to understand the nature of knowledge,
there may be no reason at all to care about our concept of knowledge.” Kornblith’s
critique involves the idea that the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept.
According to Kornblith, the consequence is that investigating our concept of
knowledge or its genesis is an infertile way to investigate the nature of knowledge.
One reason for this pessimistic view is that we can acquire and use a natural kind
concept while having radically mistaken beliefs about its referent. Such mistakes
are typically corrected by investigating the world rather than by investigating our
concepts, and Kornblith argues that the natural kind concept of knowledge is no
exception to this rule.
In “Knowledge and Certainties in the Epistemic State of Nature,” Martin Kusch
sets forth a far more optimistic view on whether a Craigian conceptual synthesis
may contribute to social epistemology. Kusch regards Craig’s approach as one of
the central examples of a social cognitive ecology. After all, Craig’s genealogy is an
inherently social ecology in that on this view the central function of the concept
of knowledge is to ﬂag good informants, something which is typically a social
matter. Kusch also regards the late Wittgenstein as an exponent of social cognitive
ecology and sets out to explore the interrelations between the late Wittgenstein and
Craig’s genealogy. A central ambition of this exploration is to argue that Craig’s
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methodology may shed light on – and augment –Wittgenstein’s remarks according
to which we cannot ascribe knowledge about common-sense certainties. However,
Kusch argues that before Craig’s methodology may be called upon in this context,
it must be modiﬁed as to accommodate Wittgenstein’s view that the concept of
knowledge is a family-resemblance concept.
Another take on Craig is provided by Christoph Kelp (“What’s the Point of
‘Knowledge’ Anyway?”), who criticizes Craig’s thesis that the function of the
concept of knowledge is to ﬂag good informants. Rather, Kelp suggests that
the function of ‘knowledge’ is “to ﬂag when agents may adequately terminate
inquiry into a given question.” Kelp provides some cases that he argues cannot be
adequately explained if ‘knowledge’ is associated with the function of information-
ﬂagging. Moreover, he argues that this diﬃculty does not arise if the function of
‘knowledge’ is understood in terms of terminating inquiry. So, Kelp concludes that
his thesis about the function of ‘knowledge’ is preferable to Craig’s thesis.
In “Steps to an Ecology of Knowledge: Continuity and Change in the Genealogy
of Knowledge,” Axel Gelfert sets forth a methodological critique that questions
some basic assumptions underlying Craig’s genealogy. Gelfert begins by criticizing
Craig and Bernard Williams (2002) for their focus on imaginary genealogies
rather than real genealogies and biological changes. Speciﬁcally, Gelfert challenges
what he calls their “Constancy Assumption,” according to which the on-board
sources of epistemic agents – e.g., perception, memory, inference, and powers
of reasoning – are held constant throughout the genealogical scenario. Gelfert
considers instead whether our cognitive capacities are “genealogically prior” to our
cognitive concepts or whether they should be regarded as co-evolving.
David Henderson’s contribution, “Gate-Keeping Contextualism,” is also
inﬂuenced by Craig’s idea that the central function of the concept of knowledge
is to ﬂag good informants. Henderson uses the term “epistemic gate-keeping”
as a label of this function of the concept of knowledge. But he emphasizes the
function’s social aspect by suggesting that one is gate-keeping for a contextually
salient community. However, since epistemic standards vary across communities,
so do the standards for ascribing knowledge. According to Henderson, a brand of
contextualism about knowledge ensues because the point of an evaluative concept
is a feature that bears on its nature. Moreover, Henderson argues that gate-keeping
contextualism has resources to respond to certain skeptical objections.
In her “Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach,” Sarah Wright also
considers variations in patterns of knowledge ascriptions from a social perspective.
She provides a case-based argument for the view that the truth-values of knowledge
ascriptions depend in part on the social roles of the subject to whom knowledge
is ascribed. According to Wright, this assumption causes prima facie trouble for
both attributer contextualism and subject sensitive invariantism (henceforth SSI).
However, Wright suggests that SSI should incorporate a social sensitivity requirement
according to which S knows that p only if S ’s belief that p displays epistemic virtue
with respect to S ’s social context. Such a modiﬁed version of SSI can, Wright
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argues, account for the cases suggesting that knowledge ascriptions are sensitive
to social roles and other cases that it cannot otherwise explain.
Finally, in “The Division of Epistemic Labour,” Sanford Goldberg distinguishes
between two species of epistemic dependence on others. Roughly, direct epistemic
dependence concerns cases in which the epistemic properties of a subject’s attitude
vary with variations in another subject’s epistemic perspective. In contrast, diﬀuse
epistemic dependence concerns, roughly, cases in which the epistemic properties of
a subject’s attitude vary with variations in the practices, states, and dispositions of
the members of a community. With this distinction in hand, Goldberg investigates
the epistemology of testimony. For example, he argues that the category of diﬀused
epistemic dependence sheds light on the phenomenon of epistemic coverage, whereby
an individual may depend on her community to discover a putative true proposition
and report it to her.
4. CONCLUSION
As the various perspectives on the prospects and problems for a social cognitive
ecology as a part of social epistemology exemplify, many foundational issues
remain open. At the one extreme, we ﬁnd optimism and excitement about a novel
philosophical method and a range of new issues. At the other extreme, we ﬁnd
skepticism regarding the very notion of a social cognitive ecology and its relevance
for social epistemology.
Whether one of these extreme positions is correct or the truth is to be found
between them, it is worth exploring diverse perspectives on the notion of a
social cognitive ecology. Hopefully, this special issue of Episteme contributes to
the methodological debates that are especially important for a relatively novel and
rapidly expanding ﬁeld such as social epistemology.
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